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I

t would be an understatement to note that the last months have not been kind to
the transatlantic relationship. When Iraq moved to the front burner, the transatlantic community was forced to tackle an issue that threatened to overwhelm it.
As a result, the spirit of transatlantic solidarity, which was so impressively displayed after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, has faded rapidly. The United States is
disappointed with what it sees as only qualified European support for the war on
terror, and it scoffs at European military weakness. Many Europeans, in turn, are
disappointed about what they perceive as a US fixation on military responses,
and they resent the US approach of casually lumping together the war on terror
with issues such as weapons of mass destruction or regime change in Iraq.
NATO, the manifestation of the transatlantic security relationship,
could never have remained unaffected by such discord. Although the real debate
on Iraq was played out in the halls of the United Nations, and although NATO was
not expected to play a direct role in a war on Iraq, sooner or later the Atlantic Alliance was bound to be hit by this debate. In February 2003, a short but agonizing
disagreement erupted over the timing of planning for the defense of Turkey in
case of war on Iraq. Only a few Allies held the view that the initiation of NATO’s
planning should be made contingent on further developments in the United Nations, yet for almost two weeks, NATO appeared to be blocked. That the disagreement was indeed one over timing, and not over substance, helped to bring
the crisis to an end before any permanent damage was done. As NATO’s Secretary General, Lord Robertson, put it in his personal account of the crisis, the Alliance had taken a hit above, not below, the waterline.
The short crisis within NATO, as well as the protracted crisis over Iraq,
demonstrated that the Atlantic community has not yet fully adjusted to the post9/11 security environment—in either political or institutional terms. However,
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one ought to resist the temptation to judge a long-term, strategic Alliance by
short-term tactical tests. The current focus on Iraq and its discontents obscures
the fact that NATO has embarked on a process of post-9/11 adaptation that will
help bridge the enormous divides within Europe and across the Atlantic that the
Iraq crisis has exposed.

The New Transatlantic Debate: 1990 Revisited
Today’s transatlantic security debate is, in essence, the debate that did
not take place a little over a decade ago, when the Cold War ended. Back then, a
fundamental discussion about the future shape of the transatlantic relationship
seemed inevitable. But it was put off. There was simply too much unfinished
business left over from the Cold War. The transatlantic community could not afford to divert its attention away from the task it still faced together: the task of
cleaning up the mess left by the Cold War. That entailed significant challenges:
l To embrace the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, who
were craving their share of Europe, including its Atlantic dimension
in NATO.
l To associate a Russia that, in a sense, was both an old empire and a new
state, still unsure of its European vocation.
l And to address the conflicts in the Balkans, which were making a mockery of the idea of Europe as a zone of peace and shared values.
Meeting these challenges required Europe and North America to work
together. Accordingly, NATO reached out to Central and Eastern Europe,
through its policy of partnership and through NATO enlargement. The Alliance
also played a major role in associating Russia to NATO and, thus, to the emerging
new Europe. And NATO played a key role in pacifying the Balkans through its
military engagement.
However, this impressive display of transatlantic unity could not hide
the fact that eventually the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic was
bound to change in the longer run. As early as 1991, the Gulf War raised the question of whether NATO was still in line with the US security agenda after the Cold
War. In that conflict, which was taking place “out of area” and fought by a “coalition of the willing,” NATO played only a supporting role. Also in the early 1990s,
the European Union (EU) started to articulate an ambition to become a military
actor in its own right, raising the question of NATO’s future. And the initial ambi-
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“The Atlantic community has not yet fully
adjusted to the post-9/11 security environment.”

guity by the United States regarding humanitarian intervention in the Balkans
signaled a profound uncertainty about how the United States viewed its own future role on the European continent. And still, despite these changes, a major debate about the future of transatlantic relations did not occur. Those on both sides
of the Atlantic did not want it to occur. And they did well by dodging it—and by
keeping their eye on the European ball.

The New Security Environment:
Pushing NATO to the Fringes?
After 11 September 2001, however, a fundamental debate about the future transatlantic security relationship could not be dodged any longer. The
changes in the international security environment had become too fundamental
to allow for business as usual. Both the transatlantic relationship in general and
NATO in particular have had to adapt to the realization that the immediate
post-Cold War period has ended and a new, still undefined era has begun. Three
changes, in particular, stand out:
l The first change concerns the new threats of terrorism and weapons
of mass destruction. These threats emerge from outside of Europe. Naturally,
they draw US attention away from the Old Continent, toward Central Asia and
the Middle East. A focus away from Europe, however, also means a focus away
from NATO, an institution that is critically dependent on US leadership.
l The second change concerns the strategies with which to respond to
the new threats. Simply put, an effective response might require a different team
and a different approach than NATO is able to provide. Afghanistan was the first
glimpse of that option. Also, NATO might be sidelined by ad hoc coalitions of
states more able and perhaps even more willing than the old NATO fogies. Furthermore, NATO might also be sidetracked because of the perception that its consensual decisionmaking culture is too slow and cumbersome to deliver results in time.
l The third change concerns the military capabilities required to respond to the new threats. Rapid response, force projection, and protection
against weapons of mass destruction are at a premium—precisely the areas in
which the United States is increasingly strong and where Europe’s Cold War legacy forces are weak. As a result, US unilateralist impulses are strengthened, and
Europeans see whatever influence they hoped to exert on Washington drifting
away down the Potomac.
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In short, by 12 September 2001, a new debate about the future of the
transatlantic security relationship had become inevitable. Dodging it again, as was
done in the early 1990s, would not work, not least since Europe today appears “settled.” NATO had to face the debate head-on, even if this meant, to use John Foster
Dulles’s term, an “agonizing reappraisal” of the value of this 54-year Alliance.

Continuities: The Enduring Transatlantic Connection
Despite the fundamental need for change, NATO could take on this reexamination of its internal relationships with considerable self-confidence. After all, 9/11 did not change everything. Despite some American claims that
Europe was “fading slowly in the US rearview mirror,” there is a transatlantic
connection that has become too firmly entrenched to be easily jettisoned.
First, European stability remains a key US strategic interest. The consolidation of Europe as an undivided, democratic, and market-oriented space remains a major objective of US security policy. Only in NATO, the central
legitimizing framework for US power in Europe, can the United States play an
undisputed leadership role in advancing this strategic objective. Thus, the United
States is not likely to surrender this role. Indeed, many US critics of Europe have
yet to grasp the fact that both NATO enlargement and the war on terrorism have
actually increased the United States’ immersion in European security affairs.
Consequently, there is no serious political force in the United States advocating a
withdrawal from Europe.
Second, Europeans remain the key strategic allies for the United States.
This statement does not exclude a stronger US focus on other regions, nor is it contradicted by the emergence of much wider “coalitions of the willing” along the
model provided by the Afghanistan campaign. Europe’s military capabilities lag
behind the United States, yet on a global scale, Europe ranks No. 2 militarily.
Moreover, although the debate preceding the war against Iraq may have suggested
otherwise, it is only in Europe where the United States finds a milieu of countries
predisposed to working with the United States. In Asia, by contrast, the United
States will have to continue to rely on bilateral relationships with politically and
culturally very different countries. In short, if the United States wants to remain the
world’s predominant power, it will have to remain a “European power” as well.
Third, the United States remains Europe’s most important ally. The
United States continues to play a unique role within the transatlantic relationship,
as a political crisis manager as well as a military coalition-builder, both within Europe (e.g., the Balkans) and beyond (e.g., the Persian Gulf). This unique US role is
widely accepted by the Europeans, notwithstanding ritualistic European criticism
of US arrogance or heavy-handedness. As in the United States, there is currently
no serious political force in Europe that would advocate a US withdrawal from the
continent. On the contrary, with Central and Eastern Europe rejoining the Atlantic
community of nations through the enlargement of NATO, the number of countries
arguing for a strong US role in Europe has only increased.
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Marrying Continuity with Change:
Three Directions of NATO’s Reform
If the above changes and continuities are taken into account, a fairly clear
picture emerges of three major directions for NATO’s reform. First, NATO must
find a new balance between addressing its traditional, Euro-centric missions and
tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Second, it must acquire the military capabilities to fulfill its new missions.
And, finally, it must learn to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges.
The Prague Summit, scheduled for November 2002, was becoming
NATO’s key opportunity to deliver on all three counts. Initially billed as an “Enlargement Summit,” the idea of making the admission of new members the sole focus of the meeting was dropped after 9/11. All the Allies agreed that NATO
enlargement would be a historic step, consolidating Europe as a single security
space from the Atlantic to the Black Sea, and from the Baltics to the Balkans. There
were widespread fears, however, that the United States might lose interest in the
Alliance if the Prague meeting did no more than issue membership invitations. Accordingly, the Prague Summit was relabeled a “Transformation Summit.”
NATO’s New Missions and the End of the “Out-of-Area” Syndrome
The first fundamental change alluded to above is for NATO to adopt
new roles in countering terrorism and dealing with weapons of mass destruction.
This is an imperative driven as much by NATO’s survival instincts as by the
changing strategic environment. If NATO were unable or unwilling to play such
a role, it would become completely detached from the US security agenda. This
would not only seal NATO’s fate as a vibrant institution, it also would deprive the
transatlantic community of a major “transmission belt” for ironing out differences on other issues. And, above all, it would condemn to the fringes what is still
the world’s most effective facilitator of military coalitions.
Even before the Prague Summit, a NATO role in combating terrorism
was being defined by two unprecedented events. The first was the invocation of
Article 5 on 12 September 2001. By agreeing that a terrorist attack by a non-state
actor should trigger NATO’s collective self-defense obligation, the Alliance in effect mandated itself to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission.
This broadening of the meaning of collective self-defense was complemented by a
second precedent: the deployment of forces from many NATO nations to Afghanistan. This marked the de facto end of NATO’s out-of-area debate, which, as the
French NATO Ambassador put it cogently, had collapsed with the Twin Towers.
The Prague Summit further defined NATO’s role in combating terrorism
with the development of a military concept against terrorism, specific military capabilities to implement this new mission, agreement on a Partnership Action Plan
against terrorism, and a stated willingness to act in support of the international
community. Prague’s definition of NATO as a focal point of any multinational military response to terrorism was given considerable credibility with the agreement
Summer 2003

93

to provide Germany and the Netherlands with NATO planning and support as they
assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) III in Afghanistan. The emerging discussion on whether NATO itself should take command of ISAF indicates that this evolution has significant potential to move
NATO into a new role outside the traditional Euro-Atlantic area.
A similar approach was taken with respect to the threat posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Before
9/11, NATO’s efforts to counter this threat appeared to be something of an afterthought. Non-US Allies had had reservations about giving prominence to this issue, but accepted it as an agenda item in part to accommodate the United States.
The Prague Summit presented an entirely different picture. The various initiatives on nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapon defenses signaled a
much stronger transatlantic consensus on the need to cope with this challenge.
Technically, these initiatives, which range from enhanced detection capabilities
to developing a Prototype Deployable NBC Analytical Laboratory, may not look
spectacular. But their immediate significance lies in the political realm. They indicate a heightened awareness of a common threat, and a determination to not let
the issue of weapons of mass destruction become a major transatlantic fault line.
This was underscored further with the agreement to begin a new NATO Missile
Defense feasibility study to examine options for protecting Alliance territory,
forces, and population centers against the full range of missile threats.
These decisions taken preceding and at the Prague Summit put NATO
firmly back on track. By claiming a distinct role in combating terrorism, and by
giving much more prominence to issues related to weapons of mass destruction,
NATO has recalibrated its agenda in line with both the emerging strategic environment post-9/11, and with the two dominant US security concerns.
NATO’s Military Reform: Bridging the Capabilities Gap
The second major element of NATO’s reform is in its overall military
capabilities. For the past several years, the priority within the Alliance has been
to improve the “European pillar.” This process was based on the need to give Europe more military clout to look after its own backyard. Implicitly, it was also
based on the eventual diminishing of the US role in future European crisis management scenarios. As 9/11 and the Afghanistan campaign demonstrated, however, “Europeanisation” is not enough to ensure transatlantic security. The
events since 9/11 demonstrate beyond a doubt that a European priority must remain the ability to cooperate militarily with the United States.
This does not diminish the strategic rationale for a European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the European Union. Yet for the EU countries
to concentrate solely on acquiring autonomous capabilities means necessarily to
concentrate on acquiring capabilities for low- and medium-intensity conflicts.
This would lead to a division of labor which neither side of the Atlantic wants,
whereby the United States does the fighting and the Europeans “do the dishes,” as a
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French observer once put it. This would be politically unsustainable, both across
the Atlantic as well as within the European Union. Some EU nations will always
want to fight alongside the United States, thereby exerting more influence on US
strategy (and perhaps sparing themselves the “dishes” part, too). In short, Europe
must look beyond ESDP and try to keep apace with the United States.
The Prague Summit made it very clear that this rationale has been understood. In line with the requirement to enhance NATO’s ability for power projection, the Alliance set in train a reform of its command structure, which will
result in more functionally oriented commands. Another significant summit decision was the adoption of the US proposal to create a NATO Response Force.
Not only did it signal NATO’s willingness to adapt in line with the requirement
for more rapid military action, it is also a catalyst to help Europeans accelerate
their force transformation, and a sign of a continued US willingness to view the
Alliance as an important military tool.
The key summit achievement in this respect, however, may well have
been the Prague Capabilities Commitment. Individual Allies made specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in areas key to modern military
operations. Once fully implemented, these commitments would quadruple the
number of outsize aircraft in Europe; establish a pool of air-to-air refueling aircraft until additional new tankers will be available; ensure that most of NATO’s
deployable high-readiness forces will have chemical, radiological, biological,
and nuclear defense equipment; and significantly increase the non-US stocks of
air-delivered, precision-guided munitions.
These commitments mark a turning point in transforming the defense
capabilities of the non-US Allies. If nations stick to these commitments, both
NATO and the EU will have made a major step forward toward meeting 21stcentury requirements. Failure to implement these decisions, however, would
deal a major blow to the transatlantic relationship, as it would confirm lingering
American doubts about the seriousness of their European Allies. It also would
represent a serious setback for Europe itself, by casting a dark shadow over the
future of the European Security and Defense Policy. For all these reasons, the
Prague Capabilities Commitment must succeed.
NATO’s Internal Reform: Toward a More Streamlined Organization
The third area of Alliance reform concerns the organization itself.
NATO’s working methods must reflect the requirements imposed by the new
strategic environment. Although the Alliance will soon have 26 members, the organization’s working methods have remained largely unchanged from those developed in the early 1950s for an Alliance of 12. Even if American charges that
the Kosovo campaign was “war by committee” were an urban myth, the need for
change is still clear. As NATO is enlarging both its membership and its mandate,
its working methods cannot be left unaffected. In a nutshell, NATO needs to be
less bureaucratic and more flexible.
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“Irrespective of disagreements on individual
issues, working together remains the preferred
option for both sides of the Atlantic.”

Almost unnoticed by the broader public, the Prague Summit made a
strong start in this direction. Heads of state and government agreed to reduce the
numbers of NATO committees (currently 467) by 30 percent. More decisions
will be pushed toward subordinate committees, leaving the North Atlantic Council room to discuss strategic issues. The procedures for ministerial meetings have
been streamlined as well, sacrificing formality in order to gain time for more substantive exchanges. Over time, these changes should lead to a different working
culture within the Alliance.
But more changes may be waiting further down the road. For example,
one could foresee arrangements whereby troop contributing nations run an operation and decide on the targeting, while the North Atlantic Council confines itself
to providing overall strategic guidance. This model, which resembles the EU’s
“committee of contributors,” may be seen by some as an assault on the cherished
rule of consensus. But it need not be. Clearly, a shift to “majority voting” in
NATO remains out of the question. The requirement for consensus not only generates pressure to seek compromise, it also provides countries with the emergency brake of a veto—an option that reassures particularly smaller countries
that they cannot be steamrolled into submission by the bigger Allies. However, a
modification of NATO’s working culture that includes the possibility of setting
up flexible coalitions, or that includes the possibility of “constructive abstention” appears not only feasible, but indispensable.
In a similar vein, the idea of NATO acting on occasion as a toolbox, i.e.
as a pool from which to provide coalitions of the willing with specific capabilities, is here to stay. Even if the notion of a toolbox-Alliance does indeed run
counter to NATO’s self-perception as a cohesive, all-for-one and one-for-all organization, resisting it may turn out to be futile. Rather than fighting against this
concept, the time may have come to look at how a toolbox approach can be reconciled with the continuing need for political cohesion. NATO’s long-stated willingness to support the European Union in crisis management is an illustration of
how well this can work—because an EU drawing on NATO assets is little else but
a coalition of the willing drawing on the NATO toolbox.
A NATO thus streamlined could deliver a range of capabilities to deal
with a range of challenges. Even on the issue of preemption, which requires rapid
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decision-taking on a potentially controversial case, one should not assume a priori that NATO would be too clumsy to deliver. The more the Allies absorb the
full implications of the new strategic environment, the more they may see a need
for quick responses. This is not to belittle the legal difficulties surrounding any
strategy that might involve preemption. But these difficulties largely stem from
the fact that the current international legal system was not built to deal with scenarios of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction. Over time, this may
change. Moreover, as the Allies have demonstrated in their Kosovo campaign,
they are perfectly able to act in a legal gray area—and take the heat for it—if the
alternatives to action appear worse.

Conclusion: Unfinished Business, but . . .
NATO’s role in the aftermath of 9/11 was hampered by three interrelated
dilemmas. First, there was no full-fledged consensus on how to tackle the new
threats. Second, the United States felt that the Europeans simply did not possess
enough useful capabilities to warrant going through NATO in order to round them
up. And, finally, some in Washington saw NATO as an organization much too tedious and cumbersome to subject American policy to it.
A little more than a year after 9/11, the Prague Summit in November 2002
demonstrated that NATO was assimilating the lessons of the attacks and their aftermath. The Alliance demonstrated an emerging transatlantic consensus on how to
tackle the new threats; it set in train a process that should result in more relevant European capabilities; and it initiated a wide-ranging reform of NATO’s working
methods. The organization had displayed that it could handle a steep learning curve.
As with any summit, the meeting in Prague could never be expected to
resolve all the Alliance’s problems. The subsequent crisis over Iraq has demonstrated that the transatlantic relationship suffers from structural dilemmas that
cannot be overcome simply by institutional fixes. For example, much of the
transatlantic divergence on Iraq stemmed from the simple but powerful fact that
since 9/11 the United States has been psychologically at war, whereas Europe has
not. Thus, Americans and Europeans will almost certainly continue to argue over
the origins of, and the response to, terrorism. Nor will there be complete convergence in threat perceptions regarding weapons of mass destruction. The Europeans share neither the US urgency to act against “axis of evil” proliferants, nor do
they share the American proclivity to write off deterrence as unworkable. And
asymmetries in military capabilities will remain, even if the Europeans fulfill
their Prague Capabilities Commitment pledges to the letter.
The Prague Summit was nonetheless highly significant. It sent a clear
signal that irrespective of disagreements on individual issues, working together
remains the preferred option for both sides of the Atlantic. As the transatlantic
relationship enters another period of fundamental transition, NATO’s Prague
Summit demonstrated that the institutional underpinnings of this relationship
are still solid.
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